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I. INTRODUCTION
The section leader ordered us to take cover and open fire.
There were seven of us, and seven or ten of the enemy. I was
too afraid to look, so I put my face in the ground and shot my
gun up at the sky. I was afraid their bullets would hit my
head. . . . I was afraid that if I didn’t fire the section leader
would punish me . . . The corporal beat the soldiers, the
sergeant beat the corporal and sometimes the 2nd lieutenant
beat the sergeant. It’s always like that in the army.
Khin Maung Than, age twelve1
More child soldiers are reported to serve in the country known today as
Myanmar,2 formerly Burma, than anywhere else in the world.3 The majority
of these Burmese child soldiers are part of the national army, the Tatmadaw
Kyi.4 Non-state opposition groups recruit children as well, though in smaller
numbers.5 In recent years promising efforts have been made to squelch the
practice of child soldiering. Most notably, the signing of a Joint Action Plan
on June 27, 2012 between the Government of Myanmar and the United
Nations committed Myanmar to end and prevent the recruitment and use of
children in the Tatmadaw.6 The Action Plan sets a timetable and measurable
activities for the release and reintegration of children soldiers in the
1

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME: CHILD SOLDIERS IN BURMA 2
(2002).
2
The correct name to use for this country is a contentious point. The country, originally
known as the Union of Burma, had its name changed in 1989 by the military-led government
to the Union of Myanmar for the purpose of lessening ethnic tensions. This name change was
not accepted by all political groups within the country. For the purposes of this Note I will
follow the lead of David I. Steinberg: Burma will be used when discussing all periods prior to
1988, and Myanmar for all events after 1988. Burma/Myanmar is used to indicate a
continuity of action. The term Burman will be used to refer to the majority ethnic group of the
country, while Burmese will be used to refer to all citizens of the country, regardless of
ethnicity. See DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA/MYANMAR: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW, at
xxi (2010).
3
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2.
4
The focus of this Note will primarily be on the use and recruitment of child soldiers by
Myanmar’s armed forces, the Tatmadaw Kyi, which recruits the overwhelming majority of
child soldiers. See id.
5
Id.
6
U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict
in Myanmar, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. S/2013/258 (May 1, 2013) [hereinafter Secretary-General
Country Report Myanmar 2013].
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government armed forces.7 Special Representative to the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, stated in a news
release, “This is an ambitious plan agreed by the Government and the United
Nations to deal with this long standing issue, and the international
community must support it. This is a testament but also a test of Myanmar’s
engagement for children.”8
A political transformation occurred in Myanmar in 2010: a general
election was held for the first time in twenty years, resulting in the
establishment of a civilian government in 2011 under President Thein Sein.9
The new government has advanced needed measures, such as the signing of
the Joint Action Plan, to end the use and recruitment of children.10 Despite
the positive steps taken since the country’s political transformation, it has
been suggested that the issue is not receiving the attention it deserves.
Richard Clarke, director of Child Soldier’s International, an independent
human rights organization, stated, “Political reforms have led to some
progress in the security and human rights situation in Myanmar . . . [but the]
government and the international community need to ensure that protection
of children in armed conflict is provided the highest priority in this reform
agenda.”11
The signing of the Joint Action Plan is an achievement in its own right for
Myanmar, yet the Action Plan alone does not resolve the issue of ending the
use of child soldiers. The Action Plan expired by its own terms in December
2013.12 It has been reported that the government of Myanmar is reviewing
the potential extension of the plan.13 As a party to the plan, the government
would have to agree to an extension in order for it to go into effect. Given
7

Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict, Myanmar Commits to Child-Free Armed Forces (June 27, 2012),
available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/myanmar-commits-to-childfree-armed-forces/ [hereinafter SRSG Press Release].
8
U.N. and Myanmar Sign Plan to Prevent Child Recruitment in Armed Forces, U.N. NEWS
CENTRE (June 27, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42333#.Uo18jGS
xN6u.
9
See Timeline: Myanmar’s Reforms Under Civilian Government, REUTERS (Oct. 10,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/14/us-myanmar-timeline-jdUSTRE79D197201
11014.
10
See Chloe Gotterson, Myanmar’s Child Soldiers, SMALL WARS J. (Aug. 10, 2013), http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/myanmar%E2%80%99s-child-soldiers.
11
Rachel Vandenbrink, Burma Still Using Child Soldiers, RADIO FREE ASIA (Jan. 23,
2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/child-soldiers-01232013180152.html.
12
See Aung Kyaw Zin, Myanmar Still Enlisting Child Soldiers: U.N. Working Group,
MYANMAR FREEDOM DAILY, http://www.mmfreedom-daily.com/?p=12323 (last visited Jan.
12, 2014).
13
Id.
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the limited success of the Action Plan during its set eighteen-month time
frame,14 an extension of the plan is essential. The goals of the plan, the
ending of the use of child soldiers and the subsequent delisting of the
Tatmadaw Kyi from the U.N. Secretary-General reports, can only be realized
when there is full compliance.
Part II of this Note will discuss the ethnographic composition of
Myanmar and will explore the history of Myanmar to illuminate why the use
of child soldiers is so prevalent in the country, specifically focusing on the
deeply rooted ideology of militaristic nationalism and the trend of interethnic
tension. Part III will focus on the phenomenon of child soldiering in modern
day Myanmar. Part IV will examine the international legal and institutional
framework for the abolition of child soldiering, specifically focusing on the
background of the U.N. Security Council’s involvement with the issue of
child soldiering. Part V will assess particular measures taken by the United
Nations to end child soldiering in Myanmar, specifically examining the
process of the U.N. Security Council. Part VI of this Note will discuss the
contents of the Joint Action Plan. Part VII of this Note will explore the
measures necessary, principally the actualization of the Action Plan, to put a
full and final stop on child soldiering in Myanmar.
II. BURMA/MYANMAR: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Ethnographic Composition
Myanmar, formerly Burma, is located in Southeast Asia.15 Myanmar is
the largest of the Southeast Asian mainland states and is roughly the size of
the state of Texas.16 The population is 52.8 million, as reported by World
Bank in 2012.17
Myanmar is an ethnically diverse country with more than 135 different
ethnic groups.18 The Burman are the largest ethnic group, comprising 69%
of the population according to the most recent official census held in 1983.19
Burmans are a powerful group controlling both the government and the
14

See Secretary-General Country Report Myanmar 2013, supra note 6, ¶ 44.
Union of Myanmar/Burma, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www.nationonline.org/
oneworld/Myanmar.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
16
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxvi.
17
Myanmar Population, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/myanm
ar/population (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
18
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, OXFORD BURMA ALLIANCE, http://www.oxfordburmaallia
nce.org/ethnic-groups.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
19
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
15
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military.20 The Burman people speak Burmese, the official language of the
country and predominately practice the Theravada Buddhist religion.21
The Karen people are one of the largest ethnic minorities in Myanmar,
comprising 6.2% of the population.22 The religious makeup of the group is a
combination of Buddhism, Animism, and Christianity, with the majority of
the group practicing Buddhism and about 20% practicing Christianity.23
Extreme tension exists between the Karen and the Burmans. Fighting has
been ongoing since the Karen sided with the Allied Forces in World War II
in hopes of gaining independence from Burma.24 However, the Karen did
not gain independence, and Karen State remained part of Burma following
decolonization.25 The failure to gain independence led to an armed uprising
by the Karen National Liberation Army, which began one of the longest
running civil wars in history.26
January 2012 produced hope that over sixty years of fighting between the
Karen and the Tatmadaw would come to an end when a ceasefire agreement
was signed between the Karen National Union and the Burmese
government.27 However, the potential for peace was short-lived when
allegations arose in March 2012 that the Tatmadaw breached the agreement
by attacking frontline positions of the Karen National Union in the northern
Karen State.28 Currently, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Karen is
ongoing.29
The Shan is a large ethnic minority in Myanmar, comprising 8.5% of the
population.30 Most of the Shan people live in Shan State in eastern
Myanmar.31 The majority of the Shan people practice Theravada Buddhism.32
Shan State is home to ethnic armies, including the Shan State Army-South.33
20

Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
Id.
22
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
23
ASHLEY SOUTH, BURMA’S LONGEST WAR ANATOMY OF THE KAREN CONFLICT 2 (Nick
Bruxton ed., 2011), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/Burma
%27s%20Longest%20War.pdf.
24
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Saw Yan Naing, Burmese Army Breaches Karen Ceasefire, IRRAWADDY (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=23211.
29
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
30
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
31
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
32
Id.
33
Id.
21
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A ceasefire was signed between the Shan State Army-South and the Tatmadaw
in December 2011, but ultimately broke down in February 2012.34 The
Tatmadaw and other government authorities have reportedly subjected
civilians in Shan State to numerous human rights violations, such as forced
labor.35
The Arakanese are an ethnic minority in Myanmar that comprises
approximately 4.5% of the population.36 The Arakanese are predominantly
Theravada Buddhists.37 The Arakanese are the largest ethnic group in
Rakhine State, which is located in western Myanmar and extends along the
Bay of Bengal.38 Rakhine State suffers from a severe lack of infrastructure,
and a large proportion of the population—approximately 60%—is reportedly
malnourished.39 Rakhine State has a history of striving for independence that
predates the country’s colonization by the British.40 In the 1950s there was a
movement that promoted the secession of Rakhine State from Burma;
however, the movement was ultimately unsuccessful.41
The Mon people comprise 2.4% of the population.42 The Mon people
primarily live in Mon State located in southern Myanmar.43 The Mon are
considered the first people to settle in Burma and the group has an ancient
and rich culture that has had a major influence on the dominant Burmese
culture.44 The Mon practice Theravada Buddhism, and are responsible for
the spread of the religion throughout Burma.45 Following Burma’s
independence, the Mon sought self-determination and were repressed by the
Burmese regime. The tensions between the Mon and the government
continued until 1996 when the groups entered into a ceasefire agreement.46
The Chin ethnic group comprises 2.2% of the population.47 The Chin
people mainly live in the Chin State located in Northwestern Myanmar.48
Approximately 80%–90% of the Chin population is Christian, due to the
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
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influence of Baptist missionaries during British colonization.49 A minority
of the Chin people adhere to traditional tribal beliefs that predate
colonization, and the remaining portion of the population practices
Theravada Buddhism.50 The Chin are one of the most persecuted minority
groups in Myanmar,51 and are subjected to grave human rights violations by
the Burmese government that are carried out in an effort to suppress the Chin
minority.52 Food consumption in Chin State is believed to be the lowest in
the country according to the United Nations World Food Program.53
The Kachin people make up 1.4% of the population in Myanmar.54 The
majority of the Kachin population resides in Kachin State located in
northeastern Myanmar, while a smaller population resides in northern Shan
State.55 Since the time of the British colonization, Christianity has been the
predominate religion practiced by the Kachin.56 Following the country’s
independence after colonization, the Kachin were subjected to discriminatory
treatment by the Burmese government. This discrimination led to the launch
of a Kachin armed resistance movement comprised of the Kachin
Independence Organization and its armed wing the Kachin Independence
Army, one of the largest ethnic resistance forces in the country.57 In 1994, a
ceasefire agreement was signed between the Kachin Independence
Organization and the Tatmadaw.58 The fifteen-year agreement was broken in
2009 when the Burmese government demanded that all ethnic ceasefire
groups transform into Border Guard Forces subject to the control of the
Tatmadaw.59 The Border Guard Forces were established in 2009 by the
government of Myanmar and are comprised of former armed groups that
have entered into ceasefire agreements with the government.60 The Border
Guard Forces operate under the control of the Tatmadaw.61 The Kachin

49

Id.
Id.
51
Sam Bagnall, Burma’s ‘Forgotten’ Chin People Suffer Abuse, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2010),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8626008.stm.
52
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
53
Bagnall, supra note 51.
54
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at xxiv.
55
Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, CHANCE FOR CHANGE 23 (2013) [hereinafter CHANCE FOR
CHANGE], available at http://www.child-soldiers.org/research_report_reader.php?id =624.
61
Id.
50
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Independence Army refused to join the Border Guard Forces and the
Tatmadaw violently responded, thus breaking the ceasefire agreement.62
Fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups is ongoing in
Myanmar, despite the establishment of a civilian government in 2011 and
subsequent ceasefire agreements entered into between the government and
certain minority groups, including the Mon and Arakan.63 These agreements
are fragile,64 and years of internal conflict have resulted in wounded
relationships that are not easily mended.
B. Ethnic Tensions and Militaristic Nationalism
The long history of ethnic tension and militaristic nationalism in
Burma/Myanmar provides insight into why the country has become a nation
that engages in the egregious practice of child soldiering.65 The children of
Burma/Myanmar, both past and present, have grown up surrounded by ethnic
tensions and civil armed conflict.66 The pervasive presence of militaristic
nationalism throughout the history of Burma/Myanmar has led the youth
population to associate nationalist pride with participation in the armed
forces.67 The divide that exists between the Tatmadaw and the smaller
minority opposition groups illustrates the ethnic tensions ingrained in the
country.68 Children raised in this type of politicized environment are easy
prey to military factions that are trying to bolster their numbers at any cost.69
In precolonial times, many Burmese communities were historically multiethnic, and there were cultural and inter-ethnic exchanges between
communities.70 Britain’s intrusion into Burma greatly disrupted this
harmony, and the “divide and rule” fixed state approach of the British
intensified ethnic divides.71 British colonization also initiated the trend of
militaristic nationalism that is still ubiquitous in Myanmar today.72
62

Ethnic Nationalities of Burma, supra note 18.
See CHANCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 60, at 8.
64
Id.
65
RUTH CONSTANTINE, EXPLAINING CHILD SOLDIERING IN CONTEMPORARY BURMA 7 (2010),
available at http://www.academia.edu/521739/Explaining_Child_Soldiering_in_Contemporary_
Burma.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 14.
68
See CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 23.
69
Id. at 30.
70
MARTIN SMITH & ANNE ALLSEBROOK, ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L, ETHIC GROUPS IN BURMA:
DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (Anne-Marie Sharman ed., 2004).
71
Id. But see STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 20.
72
CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 18.
63
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The 1885 British colonization of Upper Burma set off a rebellion that
pervaded many regions of the country by 1886.73 The British response to
this eruption of violence was swift and brutish; any indigenous person caught
pillaging or carrying firearms was shot, and villages suspected of resistance
were burned.74 During the resistance the British ruled by martial law,75
thereby setting the stage for the beginning of militaristic nationalism in
Burma. The indigenous people fought as nationalists in an effort to maintain
control of their country, forging a link between nationalism and military
force that would become, and remain, inextricable in the minds of many of
the Burmese people.76 The British suppressed the rebellion by 1890, but
maintained a military presence in the country.77
Colonial rule brought changes to Burma that primarily benefited the
British and disadvantaged the majority of the indigenous people.78 One of
these changes was the Western notion of a fixed and bound state, a notion
that led the British to quickly define territory within the country.79 The
lowlands of Burma, traditionally ruled by monarchs and inhabited by
Burmans, were taken over directly by the British.80 In contrast, the
mountainous “frontier regions,” inhabited by indigenous ethnic minorities,
were ruled indirectly by the British.81 The local authorities of the frontier
regions, chiefs and headmen, were relied on to carry out administrative
duties, yet the actual authority of these leaders was frozen.82 This
imbalanced imposition of power resulted in differing reactions to British
rule.83 The majority of the Burmese were resentful of British colonization.84
However, the minority groups accepted British rule because lowland armies
no longer came through the upland regions on war campaigns.85 The British
also allowed missionaries to establish schools and hospitals throughout the
country, including in the upland regions.86
73
MARY P. CALLAHAN, MAKING ENEMIES: WAR AND STATE BUILDING IN BURMA 24–25
(2003).
74
Id. at 25.
75
Id. at 24.
76
See CONSTANTINE, supra note 65, at 30.
77
CALLAHAN, supra note 73, at 26.
78
Id. at 23.
79
CHRISTINA FINK, LIVING SILENCE: BURMA UNDER MILITARY RULE 17 (2001).
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 17–18.
84
Id. at 18.
85
FINK, supra note 79.
86
Id.
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British attempted to
centralize law enforcement administration by establishing a civilian police
force.87 The inefficiency of the civilian force led the British to send in the
military to handle all types of local criminal activity.88 This in turn set a
quasi-custom for conflict resolution, “when local affairs get unruly, the state
sends in the military.”89
The eventual recruitment of indigenous minorities into the British
military, to the exclusion of ethnic-majority Burmans, increased ethnic
tensions between Burmans and ethnic minorities and fostered militarization
by Burmans.90 The imbalance in recruitment signaled to the Burmans that
the British’s policy was meant to segregate the races.91 Burmans reacted to
non-recruitment by forming nationalist political organizations.92
The Burman-led nationalist organizations formed armies, known as
“tats.”93 Throughout the 1930s, various religious organizations, university
student unions, and politicians formed their individual tats.94 The tats
provided military training to persons who could not obtain such training
elsewhere and led to the “Burmanization” of military terminology,
institutions, and symbols.95 These “political pocket armies”96 illustrate the
link that was strengthening between the mindset of nationalism and the
military. Further, the recruitment of youths, mainly students, into these
organizations ensured that they, too, were associating participation in a
military effort with the idea of nationalism.
World War II only furthered distrust and division between ethnic groups.
Burmans predominantly sided and fought with the Japanese.97 Most
indigenous minorities, including the Karen, remained loyal to the British.98
After the Allied forces ejected the Japanese from Burma, the British
attempted to reinstate colonial rule.99 Burmese nationalists resisted by going
on strikes, and the British, who no longer had the aid of Indian troops and

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

CALLAHAN, supra note 73, at 29.
Id. at 30–31.
Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 36, 39.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 47–48.
SMITH, supra note 70, at 23.
FINK, supra note 79, at 21.
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had insufficient funds to maintain their forces, eventually yielded.100 One of
the stipulations placed on independence by the British was that of
determining the political status of the ethnic minorities in the frontier
areas.101 Due to ethnic tensions created during colonial rule and World War
II, many ethnic leaders were hesitant to become part of the new state of
Burma.102
The visionary General Aung San, considered the father of modern
Burmese independence,103 represented the hope of bridging the gap between
the Burmans and ethnic minorities.104 Aung San reached out to nonBurmans; among other things, he placed ethnic troops that had previously
served under the British into the new army of Burma, appointed a Karen
commander-in-chief to lead the new army, and selected ethnic minorities for
high-ranking positions in the new government.105 Aung San also organized a
multi-ethnic conference in 1947, the Panglong Conference, with the aim of
devising a political structure to which both Burmans and minorities could
agree.106
The ethnic minorities’ fear of the British defaulting on their promise of
independence caused the hasty drafting of a constitution for the new union.107
The rushed process operated to disregard many ethnic minorities’
disagreements over boundary lines as well as their opposition to the new
union, and this offset Aung San’s efforts to bring together the Burmans and
ethnic minorities.108 This loss of momentum in unifying the indigenous
population of Burma was further thwarted by the assassination of Aung San
on July 19, 1947, six months before Burma gained independence on January
4, 1948.109
On their face, provisions within the constitution afforded rights to and
disbursed power amongst ethnic minorities; in reality, however, these
provisions gave very little to minority groups.110 Minorities held various

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 42.
FINK, supra note 79, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 57.
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positions within the government, but such positions were dictated by the
“Burman rules,” the rules that represented the majority of the population.111
Following the drafting of the constitution, Burma experienced a shortlived democracy under the rule of Prime Minister U Nu.112 Insurgent armed
groups sprang up during the time of the democracy, so that just one year after
its establishment the democratic government was faced with rebellion by
Karen forces.113 In 1958, the democratic government was replaced by a
caretaker government led by General Ne Win.114
This temporary
government achieved success in areas in which the democratic government
had not.115 In a feeble attempt to restore democracy, elections were held in
1960, and U Nu regained power.116 Again, there were several flaws in his
leadership, including the institution of Buddhism as the official state religion,
an act that displeased ethnic minorities.117
In 1962, Ne Win staged a coup, overthrew the civilian government, and
established a military government that reigned until 2010.118 Ne Win began
military rule by establishing the Revolutionary Council as the head of the
military regime.119 Military officials replaced civilian members of the
administration, and military-guided Security Councils were established at all
local levels.120 These Security Councils ripped away what little autonomy
was left to the ethnic states.121
In 1988, mass, nationwide peace demonstrations broke out.122 The
military violently responded to the demonstrations, opening fire against the
large groups of protesters.123 An estimated 3,000 people were killed.124
Following the outbreak the government reformed into a military junta that
called itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).125 In
1990, the SLORC held elections; however, the SLORC refused to concede
111

Id.
FINK, supra note 79, at 26–27.
113
Id. at 24.
114
Id. at 27–28.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 28.
117
Id.
118
FINK, supra note 79, at 29–30 (noting that the military government takeover was not
difficult because “democracy was only superficially rooted in Burma”).
119
Id. at 32.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 16.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
112
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power when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San,
won for the National League of Democracy.126
Elections were not held again for another twenty years.127 In 2010,
general elections were held, and in March 2011 a civilian government was
installed under President Thein Sein.128 Since then, the government has
released Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, entered into eleven ceasefire
agreements with non-state armed groups, established a National Human
Rights Commission, and relaxed press censorship.129 The government has
also shown a willingness to enter into commitments such as the Joint Action
Plan.130
III. CHILD SOLDIERS IN MYANMAR
A. History and Status of Child Soldiering in Myanmar
Both the Tatmadaw Kyi and non-state opposition groups have been
reported to engage in the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.131
The Tatmadaw is said to use and recruit children to a greater degree than all
of the opposition groups combined.132 The exact number of child soldiers
currently in the Tatmadaw and in non-state armed forces is difficult to
estimate.133 Human Rights Watch provided a rough estimate in a 2002
report, based on interviews with former Burmese child soldiers, that placed
the number of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw at 70,000 and the total number
in non-state armed groups at 6,000–7,000.134 Current estimates of the
number of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw are often not given; rather,
numbers of children released through the International Labor Organization’s
forced labor complaint mechanism are referenced.135 A recent CBS article
reported that, “Analysts say it’s unclear how many children are in Burma’s
military. About 500 boys have been discharged in the past few years,”
followed by a statement by Steve Marshall, the International Labor
126

Id.
Myanmar Profile, BBC NEWS ASIA (July 16, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldasia-pacific-12990563.
128
Id.
129
Gotterson, supra note 10.
130
Id.
131
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 2; CHANCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 60, at 13.
132
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 17.
133
Id. at 3; see CHANCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 60, at 16.
134
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1, at 187.
135
CHANCE FOR CHANGE, supra note 60, at 16.
127
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Organization’s Liaison Officer in Myanmar, describing that number as a
“small proportion” of Myanmar’s total number of child soldiers.136
Following the suppression of the nationwide democracy demonstrations
of 1988, the military government, SLORC, began an ongoing initiative to
modernize and expand the armed forces.137 This expansion marked the
beginning of the widespread recruitment of children by the Tatmadaw.138
Given the scant number of willing volunteers, this expansion has relied
heavily on forced conscription.139 Children, particularly between the ages of
twelve to seventeen years old, are especially vulnerable targets for forced
recruitment into the armed forces.140
In direct contrast to the practice of child recruitment by both the
Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups, Myanmar national law, Directive
No. 13/73 of the Myanmar Defense Services and War Office Council,
prohibits the recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen years old.141
Other laws of the country reach to the prohibition of child soldiering, albeit
not as directly, such as section 374 of the Myanmar Penal Code, which
criminalizes forced labor.142 Violation of the penal code section could result
in up to twelve months of imprisonment, a fine, or both.143
In 1993 Myanmar enacted the Child Law which penalizes offenses
against children, including the abuse and threatening of children and the
employment of children in hazardous or harmful work.144 Following the
enactment of the Child Law, Myanmar formed the National Committee on
the Rights of the Child, which serves as a coordinating body that monitors
the implementation of the Child Law.145
In January 2004, the State Peace and Development Council formed the
Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage
Children.146 The Committee’s Action Plan has three core objectives: to
prevent the forced recruitment of underage children, to protect the interests
136
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of underage children, and to ensure adherence to orders and instructions
issued for the protection of underage children.147 Thein Sein, now the
President of Myanmar, is the Chair of the Committee.148
Democratic leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi has
taken some action since her release from a fifteen-year-long house arrest in
2010 to address child soldiering in Myanmar. In 2010, Suu Kyi visited the
International Labor Organization to discuss the needed investment in
Myanmar to strengthen the country’s democracy.149 During her address she
noted the ongoing relationship between her political party and the ILO on
issues such as child soldiers: “[W]e cooperated to the best of our ability with
the ILO and other interested organizations and individuals over the issue of
forced labor and child soldiers.”150
B. The Experiences of Myanmar’s Child Soldiers
Army camps abound throughout Myanmar.151 Many are located in nonconflict areas.152 Camps in civilian areas function both to restrict the
activities of the community and to make demands for forced labor and
money.153 This constant military presence puts civilian children at risk for
recruitment.154
Reports of child recruitment have included voluntary enlistment, although
many children say that they were forcibly recruited by threat or deception.155
The Tatmadaw has certain common trends of recruitment including
recruitment from streets and pagodas of poor and unaccompanied children.156
There is also a practice of using “brokers” to recruit children.157 Brokers are
tied to local commanders or recruitment officers and receive a fee for each
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recruit they obtain.158 Brokers commonly lure children into recruitment with
promises of food and shelter.159 The local police also play a role in forced
recruitment.160 The police have been known to stop children who are not
carrying national identification cards and have given them the “choice” of
being put under arrest or joining the army.161 Children who have joined the
armed forces voluntarily proffered the following reasons for enlisting:
poverty, desire to join peers, avoidance of school, and troubles with family
members.162
Roles of children in the armed forces vary. Children are sometimes used
as porters and unarmed sentries.163 Other times, children have been made to
walk in front of marching units in areas suspected of landmine
contamination.164 It was reported in the U.N. Secretary-General’s 2013
Report on Myanmar that children are known to be deployed to the frontline
and partake in combat duties.165
Children who attempt to escape from the armed forces are often captured
and convicted of desertion; these convictions often result in prison terms
lasting up to five years.166 International law prohibits the categorization of
children as deserters when they have been illegally recruited into an armed
group.167 Many children remain in armed groups and refugee camps, fearing
that they will be arrested and imprisoned if they return to their
communities.168
IV. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
ABOLITION OF CHILD SOLDIERING
Myanmar is a state party to four pertinent treaties that relate to the
prohibition of child soldiering. These treaties include the Convention on the
Rights of the Child,169 the International Labour Organization Forced Labor
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Convention,170 the International Labor Organization Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention,171 and the U.N. Charter172—which in turn makes
Myanmar subject to oversight by the U.N. Security Council.
A. Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most widely
accepted human rights treaty among the U.N. member states, with only two
states having failed to ratify it.173 The CRC is the first international treaty to
include the full range of human rights, including civil, cultural, economic,
political, and social rights.174 The four core principles of the Convention are:
non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; the right to
life, survival, and development; and respect for the views of the child.175 By
ratifying the CRC, a country agrees to undertake the responsibilities
established by the Convention and to hold itself accountable for this
commitment before the international community.176
Myanmar ratified the CRC on July 16, 1991.177 By ratifying the
Convention, Myanmar committed itself to protecting the rights of children,
including the rights laid out in Article 38 of the CRC.178 Article 38 of the
CRC reads:
1. States Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in
armed conflicts which are relevant to the child.
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not
take a direct part in hostilities.
170
Convention Concerning Forced and Compulsory Labour (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafter Forced Labour Convention].
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3. States Parties shall refrain from recruiting any person who
has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.
In recruiting among those persons who have attained the age of
fifteen years but who have not attained the age of eighteen
years, States Parties shall endeavor to give priority to those
who are oldest.
4. In accordance with their obligations under international
humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in armed
conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to
ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an
armed conflict.179
Reports of child soldiers under the age of fifteen in the Tatmadaw contradict
Myanmar’s commitment under the CRC. Further, the lack of age
verification that takes place in recruitment180 suggests that Myanmar and the
country’s armed forces are not taking the necessary steps to confirm age.
This lack of age verification fails to give priority to the oldest youth—ages
fifteen to eighteen—that voluntarily enlist in the armed forces.
B. International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention
Myanmar ratified the International Labour Organization Forced Labour
Convention on March 4, 1955.181 The Convention’s aim is to prohibit all
forced and compulsory labor, aside from enumerated exceptions laid out in
Article 2.182 The pertinent article of the Convention as it relates to the
prohibition of child soldiering is Article 11, which defines individuals that
can be required to engage in permitted forced or compulsory labor as “adult
able-bodied males who are of an apparent age of not less than 18 and not
more than 45 years.”183 Article 11 thus prohibits the use of persons under the
age of eighteen for forced labor. By ratifying the Convention, Myanmar
committed to refraining from using children in forced labor. The use of
children soldiers under the age of eighteen who did not voluntarily enlist
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qualifies as forced labor, thus its practice is in direct violation of the
Convention.
C. International Labour Organization Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention
On December 18, 2013, Myanmar ratified the Worst Forms of Child
Labour Convention.184 Article 3 of the Convention includes in its definition
of the “worst forms of child labor” the “forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict.”185 The Convention requires signatories
to immediately secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of
child labor186 through the use of monitoring mechanisms187 and the
implementation of action programs.188 Ratification of the Convention
demonstrates that Myanmar recognizes that the forced recruitment of
children into the military is egregious and that its elimination is essential.
Due to the recent nature of Myanmar’s ratification it is yet to be determined
if Myanmar will act in accordance with the Convention.
D. U.N. Security Council’s Involvement in the Issue of Children and Armed
Conflict
In 1996, the Graça Machel report on the “Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children” was published, and ultimately led to major developments by the
U.N. regarding children and armed conflict.189 The Machel Report focused
on articulating an agenda for action by U.N. member states and the
international community to improve the protection and care of children in
armed conflict situations.190 The Machel Report spurred the U.N. General
Assembly to call for the appointment of a Special Representative on the

184
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Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.191 In 1998, Mr. Olara Otunnu was
appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Children and
Armed Conflict.192 In 1999, Mr. Otunnu presented the Security Council with
information about the use of child soldiers.193
The Special Representative’s findings led the Security Council to adopt
significant resolutions pertaining to children and armed conflict. In 1999, the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1261 which stated that international law
prohibits the use of children as soldiers and urged states to strengthen efforts
to end the use and recruitment of children in armed conflict.194 Resolution
1261 gave “full legitimacy” to placing the issue of the protection of children
exposed to conflict on the agenda of the Security Council.195 The following
year, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1314, which is notable for
linking the mandatory power of the Security Council with the issue of
children and armed conflict.196 In 2001, the Council adopted Resolution
1379, which requested the Secretary-General attach a list to his future reports
of parties to armed conflict, that were also on the Security Council’s agenda,
that recruit or use children in violation of international obligations applicable
to them under the U.N. Charter.197 The listing of violators of children’s
rights has been utilized by the Secretary-General in each report since 2002.
Resolution 1460, adopted in 2003, expanded the listing practice to include
“parties to other armed conflicts that recruit or use children which are
mentioned in the report.” This resolution swept more broadly than 1379, to
include parties that were not considered part of the Security Council’s
agenda.198
191
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Resolution 1539, adopted in 2004, expanded the protection afforded
children in armed conflict in that it condemned additional violations against
children.199 The listed violations would eventually become known as the
“six grave violations,” and would subsequently become the foundation of the
U.N. monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict.200
Resolution 1539 asked the Secretary-General to devise an “action plan for a
systematic and comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism.”201
The Secretary-General complied with this request, and included such an
action plan in his 2005 report on children and armed conflict.202
In 2005, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1612, which called for
the adoption of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism for parties listed in
Annex I of the Secretary-General’s reports.203 Resolution 1612 also
established the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed
Conflict.204
The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism works through country task
forces that are comprised of representatives from different U.N. bodies as
well as representatives of non-governmental organizations.205 The country
task forces monitor violations at the country level and then report to the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed
Conflict.206 The Special Representative, with assistance from a U.N.
committee, sends reports to the Secretary-General, who then presents them to
the Security Council Working Group.207 The Working Group, composed of
fifteen Security Council members, meets in closed sessions to review reports
from the Secretary-General as well as progress made in the enactment of
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action plans.208 At the close of these sessions, the Working Group renders
conclusions that include recommendations to parties to conflict, to
governments, and to U.N. actors on methods to foster the protection of
children affected by armed conflict.209
Despite the monitoring of the six grave violations, the majority of
attention has been placed on one particular violation: the recruitment and use
of children as soldiers.210 Commission of this violation is likely to lead to
the listing of a party in annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on
this issue.211
V. THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO END CHILD SOLDIERING IN
MYANMAR
A. U.N. Actions Pertaining to Children and Armed Conflict in Myanmar
from 2000 to 2007: The Secretary-General’s Annual Reports
The Secretary-General provides the Security Council’s Working Group
on Children and Armed Conflict with an annual report that gives an
overview of the situation of children in conflict zones and of child-protection
measures. The Secretary-General began issuing reports on children and
armed conflict in 2000.212 Myanmar was not expressly mentioned in this
first report,213 and was only briefly mentioned in the 2001 report.214 The
2002 report contained a list of violating parties as requested under resolution
1379. But Myanmar was not included on this list; rather, Myanmar was
discussed as an area that was not on the agenda of the Security Council.215
The 2002 report noted that Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental
organization, had reported that large numbers of children were forcibly
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recruited into the Tatmadaw, and that UNICEF had confirmed the report.216
Further, in 2002, the Secretary-General wrote about the recruitment of
children by other non-state opposition groups.217
The Secretary-General’s 2003 report briefly discussed Myanmar and
stated that children were still being forcibly recruited by government armed
forces.218 For the first time, the 2003 report included two annexes listing
parties that committed the violation of recruiting and using children in armed
conflict.219 Myanmar was included in Annex II, which pertained to “other
parties” that were not on the Security Council’s agenda but that had been
mentioned in the previous report. Three Burmese groups were listed as
committing the violation of recruitment and use of children in armed
conflict. Included were the government armed forces, the Tatmadaw Kyi, as
well as two non-state opposition groups, the Karen National Union, and the
Karenni National Liberation Army.220
The Secretary-General did not issue a general annual report on children
and armed conflict in 2004. In his 2005 report, the Secretary-General
included a section on developments in Myanmar. For the first time, a report
noted positive progress in Myanmar. The Myanmar Government was
reported to have concluded ceasefire agreements with seventeen armed
groups, and in January 2004 the Government established the Committee for
the Prevention of Military Recruitment of Underage Children.221 In October
2004 the Committee developed a plan of action that provided for the
discharge of children less than eighteen years of age from military service
and for reintegration of those children back into their families and
communities.222 Despite the improvements discussed, the report also
mentioned the U.N. country team had reported the continued recruitment and
use of children.223 Two offenders, the KNLA and KA, were reported not to
have committed to ending the practice.224 Myanmar again was listed in
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Annex II in the 2005 report,225 an indication that Myanmar was still not on
the agenda of the Security Council.
The Secretary-General’s 2006 report contained substantially more
information regarding developments in Myanmar. The report is especially
notable because it is the first to provide the number of children recruited by
the Tatmadaw, citing twelve “detailed and credible” allegations of forced
recruitment since the beginning of 2005.226 This figure does not seem
representative of the reality of child recruitment in the country, but it
indicates progress in gaining reliable information regarding child
recruitment. The report stated that there was continued recruitment and
training of children not only by the Tatmadaw, but also by non-state armed
forces; it observed, however, that limitations on access made these reports
difficult to verify.227 It later stated that a “fundamental problem” in
Myanmar was the limitations put on the access of humanitarian actors to
communities in conflict zones.228 The Government was said to have put
these limitations in place for alleged “security reasons.”229 The Government
continues to limit access to conflict zones, which hinders both the
verification progress and the provision of humanitarian support. Child
Soldiers International reported in January 2013 that Myanmar was limiting
the access of the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations to certain
conflict-affected areas and contested regions of the country.230
The developments section of the 2006 report also tracked the progress of
Myanmar’s Committee for the Prevention of Military Recruitment of
Underage Children. It noted that the Committee convened on February 3,
2006 and was engaged in efforts to promote awareness among military
establishments, training institutions, and local communities.231 It also stated
that UNICEF and the Government had discussed the need to develop the
Committee’s plan of action in order to prevent the recruitment of child
soldiers.232 The report stated that the U.N. country team was aware that
children had been released from the army, but was unable to verify the
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effectiveness of the plan.233 The 2006 report was the first report in which
Myanmar was listed in Annex I.234 This alteration would seem to indicate
that Myanmar had been placed on the Working Group’s agenda, although the
Secretary-General’s report in 2007 stated that Myanmar was not put on the
Working Group’s agenda until April 2007.235
B. Myanmar’s Placement on the Working Group’s Agenda: The SecretaryGeneral’s Country Reports and the Working Group’s Conclusions
The Secretary-General’s 2007 report was thus significant in that it both
announced Myanmar’s addition to the Working Group’s agenda and stated
that Myanmar had agreed to establish a monitoring and reporting mechanism
in accordance with Resolution 1612.236 Despite these positive developments,
the Secretary-General expressed continued concern regarding limited access
to conflict-affected areas as a potential hindrance to the effective and
independent functioning of the monitoring and reporting mechanism.237
Once Myanmar was placed on the agenda of the Security Council’s
Working Group, the Secretary-General began to issue country reports
focused exclusively on children and armed conflict in Myanmar. The three
reports issued for the country thus far cover lengthy reporting periods
spanning anywhere from a year and a half to over three years.
The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examines the
Secretary-General’s country reports and adopts conclusions that are later
issued as an official document of the Security Council.238 The conclusions
include the Working Group’s reaction to the report, as well as
recommendations to the Security Council, the government of Myanmar, and
to the Secretary-General.
The Secretary-General issued his first country report focused on children
in armed conflict in Myanmar on November 16, 2007.239 The report covered
the period of July 2005 through September 2007.240 The report commended
the Government’s establishment of a formal monitoring and reporting
233
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mechanism, in accordance with Resolution 1612, during the Special
Representative Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy’s visit in June 2007.241 The
Secretary-General reported that in September 2007 the Government
established a working group for the mechanism. In conjunction with the
U.N. Country Task Force, that group was to engage in monitoring and
reporting, in training on relevant laws, and in submitting allegations of child
recruitment to the authorities.
The 2007 report noted that the Government and the International Labor
Organization had entered into a Supplementary Understanding establishing a
complaint mechanism under which individuals can submit complaints of
forced labor, including child recruitment, to an ILO liaison officer in
Yangoon, the former capital of Burma.242 The ILO Forced Labour
Convention was the treaty under which the Supplementary Understanding
was formed.243 Since January 2013, the ILO has received 778 complaints
and has prompted the successful release of 267 child soldiers.244
Despite the progress of the Government, the Secretary-General expressed
trepidation in his 2007 report about the limited access to locations of
concern.245 Access to those locations is vital in order to monitor the
implementation of mechanisms as well as verify efforts purportedly taken by
the Government to end recruitment.246 In the portion of the report centered
upon the recruitment and use of children by armed groups, incidents and
trends tied to continued recruitment were discussed, including the pressure
for the Tatmadaw to accelerate recruitment, patterns in underage recruitment,
and age verification issues.247 Likely due to the restrictions placed on access,
the report only discussed three verified cases of child recruitment by the
Tatmadaw.248 Further, despite the Government Committee’s presentation of
reports to the U.N. on awareness raising programs and information on
released children, the Secretary-General noted that “to date cooperation on
concrete action remains very limited,” due to the inability of the U.N. to
confirm any of these actions because of access restrictions.249
The Secretary-General’s first report commended the positive steps taken
by the Government of Myanmar while retaining a stern stance that further
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measures were required to achieve the end of recruitment. The Working
Group’s conclusions to the report recommended that the Government
increase public awareness about child soldiering, allow access for the
Country Task Force where illegal recruitment had been reported, and
prosecute persons found responsible for the illegal recruitment of children.250
The Secretary-General issued the second country report in 2009, fewer
than two years after the issuance of the first report. The second report
addressed positive initiatives undertaken by the Government during the
reporting period. These initiatives included: the detection and release of
seventy-six children in military schools; the implementation of procedures to
aid in the rehabilitation and reintegration of children released from the armed
forces; and the dismissal of nine military officials found to have engaged in
illegal recruiting.251 Although he lauded the initiatives, the SecretaryGeneral stressed that the Government’s actions could not be verified due to
continued restricted access to contested areas.252 Additionally, the SecretaryGeneral expressed disapproval of the Government’s reliance on the ILO
complaint mechanism as the sole means of obtaining reports of illegal child
recruitment and urged an expanded, more developed monitoring program.253
The Secretary-General’s report identified core issues restraining the U.N.,
including restricted access, the lack of security measures for victims and
witnesses who report illegal recruitment, and the absence of an agreed action
plan.254 The second report placed particular emphasis on the necessity of an
action plan to close the gap between the policy of ending child recruitment
and its actual application.255
The report noted discussions that took place between the U.N. Country
Task Force and the Government on the development and implementation of
an action plan, and the submission of a draft action plan to the
Government.256 The highlighted components of the action plan included
independent access for the U.N. to recruitment centers and camps, reporting
and verification of compliance, access to non-state actors to facilitate
250
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dialogue for action plans, and assurance of the safety of monitors and
witnesses.257 Despite the discussions with the Government’s monitoring and
reporting, the U.N. Country Task Force had not yet been able to discuss the
action plan formally with the Government’s high-level committee.258
The Working Group’s conclusions to the second country report indicated
that a meeting eventually did take place between the U.N. Country Task
Force and the government high-level committee on August 2009, a few
months after the Secretary-General’s 2009 report had been issued.259 The
Working Group encouraged the finalization of the action plan in its
recommendations to the government of Myanmar.260 The conclusions also
urged the Government to facilitate access for the U.N. Country Task Force,
to increase accountability for persons found to recruit children illegally, and
to expand the ILO complaint mechanism.261
The Secretary-General’s third, and most recent, country report was issued
on May 1, 2013.262 The report covered the longest reporting period to date:
three years and nine months. During the third reporting period, substantial
changes occurred in Myanmar, including the establishment of a civilian-led
administration in March 2011 under President Thein Sein. The third report
noted progress made by the new government, including discussion with nonstate armed groups, which resulted in ceasefire agreements with ten of the
country’s eleven ethnic groups.263 The report also expressed appreciation for
Sein’s efforts to lead a peace-building and reconciliation process by
establishing peacemaking committees.264 Despite the positive change in the
legal landscape, however, the report pointed out that access restrictions
remained and continued to impede the monitoring and reporting functions of
the group during the reporting period.265
Notwithstanding the positive actions undertaken by the Government in
accordance with the country’s laws and military directives, the Tatmadaw
reportedly continued to recruit children during the third reporting period.266
However, the ILO complaint mechanism reported 802 cases of underage
257
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recruitment, 770 of these complaints were verified.267 The increased number
of complaints filed each year between 2009 and 2012 indicated greater
public awareness of the complaint mechanism.268 As of December 2012, the
Country Task Force had been told that the Tatmadaw had released 448
recruits, and that the number of children recruited each year from 2009 to
2012 decreased.269
The third country report was especially significant in that it reported the
signing of an action plan between the government of Myanmar and the U.N.
Country Task Force. For many years, both the Secretary-General and the
Working Group had encouraged the action plan.270 The signing of the plan
symbolized the hope that the gap between the policy of ending child
recruitment and application would finally be filled.
VI. THE JOINT ACTION PLAN
After six years of negotiations, on June 27, 2012, the government of
Myanmar and the U.N. Country Task Force signed a Joint Action Plan to
end and prevent the recruitment and use of children in the Tatmadaw,
including the integrated Border Guard Forces.271 The Action Plan was
negotiated under Resolution 1612.272 The Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the Myanmar Minister of Defense Hla Min, and highranking officers of the Myanmar armed forces were present at the signing of
the plan in Myanmar’s capital, Nay Pyi Taw.273
The press release issued by the U.N. regarding the action plan provided
little information regarding the plan’s substance, stating only that “the action
plan sets a timetable and measurable activities for the release and
reintegration of children associated with Government armed forces, and for
the prevention of further recruitment.”274 In fact, the Action Plan is not a
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public document.275 Action plans entered into between the United Nations
and parties to armed conflict are not made public unless the listed party
chooses to make the document public.276 As can be seen from the Action
Plan in Myanmar, the signing of such plans is typically widely reported,277
but the disclosure of the contents of the actual action plan seems only to have
extended to senior-level officials in the Tatmadaw.278
Despite the nonpublic nature of the Action Plan, much can be gleaned
about the substance of the plan from the Secretary-General’s third country
report on Myanmar. The 2013 report stated that the Action Plan contains a
set of commitments to be pursued by the Government of Myanmar and the
U.N. Country Task Force over an initial eighteen-month period.279 The
commitments included the systematic identification, registration, and release
of all children under the age of eighteen who were recruited and used in the
Tatmadaw; the reintegration of such children back into their communities;
the strengthening of recruitment procedures to ensure the prevention of
further child recruitment by the Tatmadaw; the raising of public awareness
on how to prevent underage recruitment; training and capacity-building for
the Tatmadaw on international human rights, including child protection; and
the strengthening of disciplinary actions against persons found to participate
in underage recruitment.280 The commitments explicitly listed in the report
likely do not provide a comprehensive description of the plan, but they,
along with other information included in the Secretary-General’s report,
provide valuable insight into the goals of the plan.
Following the June 2012 signing of the Action Plan, the Tatmadaw
appointed a senior liaison officer to oversee the plan’s implementation.281 At
the time the Secretary-General’s third report was issued in May 2013, efforts
to implement the Action Plan included the development of detailed
operational procedures for identifying, verifying, and discharging children
recruited or present in the armed forces.282
In September 2012, the Tatmadaw reported that trainings on the Action
Plan had been carried out at military focal points in each regional command,
275
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and forty-two children had been discharged from the Tatmadaw at a
ceremony in Yangon.283 The Tatmadaw also reportedly issued instructions
on the implementation of the action plan and made materials on the plan to
distribute to military personnel.284
The ILO complaint mechanism, established in 2007, has worked in
conjunction with the Action Plan.285 In October 2012, the Country Task
Force submitted twenty-five cases of underage recruitment, received through
the complaints mechanism, to the Tatmadaw senior liaison officer.286 By
December 2012, the Tatmadaw identified twenty-four child recruits and
discharged them in February 2013.287
The Secretary-General’s 2013 report expressed optimism that the slow
start and low numbers during the first six months of the Action Plan would
increase in the following months once the new identification process was
implemented in all military units, the Country Task Force was granted access
to operational regiments of the military, and materials on the Action Plan
were dispersed among the Tatmadaw and general public.288
The ubiquitous problem of restricted access was still a noted concern.
The 2013 report explicitly stated that access for the Country Task Force to
“military bases, prisons and other places where children may be present” was
stipulated in the Action Plan for purposes of monitoring and verifying the
implementation of the plan.289 Despite this commitment, in December 2012
the Tatmadaw had notified the Country Task Force that access to operational
regiments would be subject to their consideration.290 As of January 2013, the
Country Task Force was only permitted access to regional commands,
recruitment units, and training schools.291 The Country Task Force also
expressed concern about the limited dissemination of the Action Plan.292 The
task force expressed the necessity that the plan be disseminated to all levels
of the military to ensure effective implementation of the key commitments of
the plan.293
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As of October 2013, two months before the expiration of the Action Plan,
176 children had been discharged from the Tatmadaw, and sixty-eight of
those children were released in August 2013.294 At the time of the October
2013 discharge it remained unclear how many children were serving in the
Tatmadaw.
According to Steve Marshall, the International Labor
Organization Myanmar Liaison Officer, “the belief is it’s considerably more
than the number who have currently been discharged.”295 It has been
postulated that the number of children released during the term of the Action
Plan constitute only a fraction of those believed to be to be in the
Tatmadaw.296
The eighteen-month time frame stipulated in the Joint Action Plan
expired in December 2013. Since the expiration of the Action Plan the
Tatmadaw has continued to steadily release children from its ranks.297 In
August 2014 ninety-one children were released from the Tatmadaw.298 On
September 25, 2013 the Tatmadaw, in the largest discharge since the signing
of the Action Plan, released 109 children during a ceremony attended by the
Union Minister for Defense Lieutenant General Wai Lwin.299 Myanmar’s
government was commended for the September release by Ms. Renata LokDessallien, the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Myanmar
and co-chair of the Country Task Force, who said, “[t]he United Nations
welcomes today’s release of a further 109 children and young people. We
are witnessing an increasing number of children coming out of the
Tatmadaw, indicating the accelerated efforts of the Government . . . and the
Tatmadaw to put an end to the harmful practice of recruiting and using
children.”300 Since the signing of the Action Plan a total of 472 children
have been released from the Tatmadaw’s ranks.301
Despite the progress being made by the Tatmadaw the forced recruitment
of children is still occurring and the exact number of children present in the
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Government’s armed forces remains unknown.302 Charu Hogg, the Asia
Program Manager at Child Soldiers International, an independent human
rights organization, illustrated continued concern notwithstanding the recent
releases of children soldiers, “recruitment and use of children by the
Tatmdaw continues to date, despite the signing of the Action Plan. The
numbers have been reduced but the practice has not been eliminated.”303
Until the practice is completely eradicated it is indisputable that the Action
Plan term will need to be reinstated and extended. On September 26, 2014,
the day after the major discharge of children from the Tatmadaw, the U.N.
Country Task Force and Myanmar’s government were scheduled to meet to
review the Action Plan.304 At the meeting the two sides were to discuss the
progress made under the Action Plan and to identify the remaining steps
needed to end the recruitment and use of children by the Tatmadaw.305 The
Action Plan provides for the necessary measures to end recruitment, if the
Plan is reinstated for a longer term and the Government fully commits to
adhering to the Plan, there would be a realistic hope of ending the practice of
child soldiering by the Tatmadaw.
VII. ATTAINING THE GOAL: THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE JOINT ACTION
PLAN
Reinstating the Action Plan and extending its term, albeit a necessary
step, is only the beginning of achieving the actualization of the Action Plan
and, in turn, ending the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The
Government and the Tatmadaw will have to make considerable efforts to
implement the commitments contained in the Action Plan. The U.N.
Country Task Force stated their concerns regarding barriers to the successful
implementation of the Action Plan in the Secretary-General’s third report.306
These concerns echo the remedial measures advocated by many international
human rights groups. Charu Hogg, the Asia Program Manager at Child
Soldiers International, identified five key characteristics that make action
plans successful: access, demobilization, prevention, accountability, and
302
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reintegration.307 These characteristics are likely contained in the substance of
the Action Plan, but the true understanding and actual implementation of
these particular measures provide the best road map for the action plan’s
eventual success.
Access has been a constant hindrance to the U.N. Country Task Force.
Without unimpeded access the Country Task Force is unable to carry out its
most critical role: monitoring and verifying the implementation of the Action
Plan by the Tatmadaw. Without access the Country Task Force is left to rely
solely on reports of the Tatmadaw. Hogg explained that the ideal scenario
would be unimpeded access for the Country Task Force without any prior
notice requirements.308 Although it seems unlikely that this scenario will be
attained given the actions of the Tatmadaw, the Government should honor
the commitments set forth in the Action Plan which stipulate that the
Country Task Force will have access to military bases, prisons, and other
places where children may be present.309
Demobilization is obviously the core goal of the Action Plan. Access is
required to ensure that goal is obtained and prevention is necessary to ensure
that the egregious practice does not continue. Effective prevention of
underage recruitment begins with the establishment of a reliable system for
age verification of recruits.310 Verification begins with birth registration;
Myanmar law advises parents or guardians to register children at birth, when
they reach the age of ten, and again when they turn eighteen.311
Unfortunately, birth registration is not a common practice in rural areas.312
When a child turns ten she is eligible for a National Registration Card,
although the process of obtaining this documentation is difficult and
expensive.313 The Government should make the process of birth registration
easier and more accessible. The process for obtaining a National
Registration card should also be more accessible and should only have to be
done once. The Government should make the falsification of documents
more difficult. With a strengthened age verification system and documents
that cannot easily be forged, the risk of children without authentic
documentation or falsified documents would be greatly reduced, and these
children would no longer be easy prey for recruiters.
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Another preventive step that should be taken is the professionalization of
the recruitment process. Tatmadaw recruiters should receive proper training
on age verification measures, and a centralized database should be
established that contains the names, ages, and supporting documentation for
all recruits.314 The database should also name the recruiting officer
responsible for the new recruit315 to incentivize proper recruitment and to
enhance accountability when underage recruitment is detected. Another,
broader preventive measure would be the overall professionalization of the
Tatmadaw.316 Presently there are high desertion rates that put pressure on
recruitment. If the Tatmadaw improved pay and conditions, desertion rates
would likely decrease.317 Additionally, a leaner, more professional army
would reduce recruitment pressures and in turn eliminate the temptation of
recruiting children.318
A key component to ending the cycle of child recruitment is identifying
those responsible and holding them accountable for their actions. The
Secretary-General’s third country report on Myanmar stated that the
commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw issued a directive on April 20, 2012,
indicating that action would be taken against those who took part in illegal
recruitment under the Myanmar Penal Code.319 The Government reported
increasing numbers of disciplinary actions were taken between 2009 and
2012.320 These included rank demotion, salary deduction, imprisonment,
reprimand, pension reduction, and dismissal.321 Yet, the majority of the
persons disciplined were only reprimanded.322 Disciplinary action must go
beyond reprimands and reflect the seriousness of the horrendous act of child
recruitment. The practice of child recruitment is illegal and punishable under
the Myanmar Penal Code, but issues arise during the prosecution of the
offense. The judicial system in Myanmar must undergo a reform to ensure
that effective prosecution is taking place.323 Charu Hogg said that, to her
knowledge, there has been only one case of a civilian broker being
prosecuted in the court system.324 Thus, the Government should provide a
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judicial system that is capable of effectively prosecuting those found to
engage in this activity. The appropriate disposition for persons convicted
should include dismissal and imprisonment. A strong message needs to be
sent in order to end the cycle of underage recruitment.
In the process of ending the use and recruitment of children, it is crucial
not to forget the psychological health of the discharged children.
Reintegration of discharged child soldiers is necessary for the wellbeing of
both the child and society. In October 2002, Carol Bellamy, then UNICEF
Executive Director, said, “[S]uccessful . . . demobilization programs serve to
take the guns out of their hands, but we will still be failing these children if
[we] do not find ways to reunite them with their families and communities
and provide for their psycho-social care and recovery.”325 During their time
in the armed forces, children can become asocial326 and traumatized327 by
their experiences. A father who believed he had lost his son in Cyclone
Nargis later found out that his son had been recruited by the Tatmadaw.
After serving three and a half years in the army, the boy’s father was able to
lobby for his son’s release. Since his return, the father said that his son was
changed, describing the son’s “attitudes and behaviors” as “very rude.”328
To help children renew positive social relations and productive civilian lives,
it is preferable to reintegrate children into their families and communities, as
opposed to utilizing specialized reintegration centers.329 Children also
should not have to miss out on educational opportunities because of their lost
years spent in the Tatmadaw. Flexible educational opportunities should be
made available to them330 so they can pursue careers of their choice and
contribute to society.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The history of the country now known as Myanmar is riddled with ethnic
tensions and ingrained with militaristic nationalism. Both of those pressures
contribute to the pervasive use of child soldiers in the armed forces. Recent
developments, most notably the establishment of a civilian government, have
inspired optimism in the international community that the country would
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begin to take steps towards ending the grave violation of the use and
recruitment of children in the armed forces.331 The Joint Action Plan signed
in June 2012 between the Government and the U.N. Country Task Force
symbolized Myanmar’s willingness to reform and illustrated the
Government’s commitment to not violate the pertinent treaties to which
Myanmar is a party.332
The implementation of the Action Plan did not proceed at an ideal
pace.333 The eighteen-month time frame stipulated in the action plan expired
in December 2013.334 To achieve the goal of complete demobilization of
child soldiers, the Action Plan will unquestionably have to be reinstated and
its time frame extended.
The key components to the success of the action plan are as follows:
unrestricted access for the U.N. Country Task Force to areas stipulated in the
Action Plan; demobilization; prevention; accountability; and reintegration.335
Based on a reading of the Secretary-General’s 2013 report, these components
are, to some extent, provided for in the Action Plan. Demobilization is the
core goal of the Action Plan; this goal, however, is entirely dependent on the
Government and Tatmadaw’s adherence and commitment to the components
laid out above. Unrestricted access without required prior notice for the U.N.
Country Task Force will ensure that the effective monitoring and verification
of the plan’s implementation is taking place.
Yet, access in itself is not enough. Preventive measures need to put in
place to guarantee that the Tatmadaw is sustaining the commitment to nonrecruitment once the Country Task Force is not present. Such preventive
measures should be adopted immediately by the Government and the
Tatmadaw, and should include a centralized recruitment database listing the
names and ages of recruits, as well as the name of their recruiting officer,
thus supporting age verification documentation. The database would
function more smoothly were the Government to create more accessible birth
registration and take measures to make the process of falsifying documents
more difficult. Naming the recruitment officer in the centralized database
would enhance accountability measures.
During the process of demobilization the discharged child soldiers cannot
be forgotten. These children are returning to their communities as very
different people, and must be provided with the resources and support to
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effectively reintegrate back into their civilian lives. Discharged children
should interact with trained professionals who can assist them in re-engaging
in positive social relations. Additionally, flexible educational opportunities
should be made available to allow children to compensate for time lost while
in the armed forces.336
Myanmar is at a pivotal point in redressing this grave violation committed
against children. The new civilian government has signed onto reform
efforts, like the Joint Action Plan, and continues to enter ceasefire
agreements with non-state armed groups. This progression signals an
optimistic future for the elimination of the use and recruitment of children
soldiers, but the goal must be kept in sight. The Government and the
Tatmadaw must honor the commitments laid out in the Action Plan to ensure
the ongoing protection of all of its children.
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